423 311 either by the simple process of extending existing land reserves, or by acquisition—sometimes outright expropriation—of "kulak" lands or communally-organized "model" farms. By the close of 1949, State farms in Czechoslovakia, for example, had increased by 600 percent. By and large, however, the areas controlled by the State farms—particularly in Hungary—contained a disproportionate share of non-cultivated land (see Chart V).

In Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary, the State sector comprised an area of considerable importance, and it was on the State farms—theoretically, at least, the highest existing form of "Socialist agriculture"—that the chief Communist hopes rested. It is, in fact, the case that in the East European Satellites, State Farms achieved a higher level of development in general than in the Soviet Union at a comparable stage, since the initiative of the Russian peasantry in 1917-18 prevented the large-scale land seizures on which a State farming system could be based.

423 474 But in the Satellites, as in the Soviet Union, the primary effort was devoted to the collective farm. In the Satellites, where the land offensive had a thoroughly bureaucratic character, the collective farms offered the additional advantage of *flexibility*. A variety of collectivized farms were created to facilitate the peasants' progress from independent farming to full collectivity. Even the terms used to describe the collective farms—"Agricultural Producers' Cooperatives" in Poland, for example—were designed to blur the true implications and to mask the ultimate purpose of collectivization. Similarly, in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, the very name for collective farms—*zadrugi*—was a calculated attempt to evoke memories of the ancestral communal traditions of the southern Balkans.

Thus the regimes trod softly in the early years. In Czechoslovakia, for example, four types of "Uniform Agricultural Cooperatives" (UAC) were established from which the peasants—in accordance with the "voluntary" principle—might choose:

Type I Joint tillage of the land, but retention of title in real property contributed, as well as in draft animals, farm equipment, and the harvested crops.

Type II Joint tillage of the land, but title retained in real property, draft animals, and farm equipment; all boundaries plowed over, and plots grouped in "land

CHART V

GROWTH of STATE FARMS 1949 – 1952*

(percent of arable Land)

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

* Rude Pravo, October 28, 1952; Rocznik Statis. 1949 (Warsawi, 1950; For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy! (Bucharest), January 30, 1953; March 17, 1950; September 11, 1953; Agerpress IVth Year Bucharest), No. 2, January 17, 1953; Purl i Kredit (Sofia), No. 2, 1948, p. 80.

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compounds"; rent received on land, livestock, and equipment contributed.

Type III Joint tillage of the land and joint care of livestock; basic means of production *purchased* by the cooperative; rent still recognized, but limited to 10-20 percent of the total farm income—the remainder of income distributed according to work done.

Type IV Land and means of production common property; land rent abolished as "unearned income," and each member paid according to work units.

Type I is little more than a peasant partnership. Type IV is the true *kolkhoz, patterned after the Soviet artel.*

Similarly, in Poland four types were created, in Hungary and Romania three, in Bulgaria only one. The form stressed at any one period might vary from country to country as the needs of the State and the local strategy of collectivization demanded.

The proportion of collectives which are of the most advanced, or kolkhoz, type varied from one country to another. (See Table 7). In Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia the vast majority of collectives were of an intermediate character as late as 1951; in Romania and Poland, on the other hand, a majority were of the most advanced type.

TABLE 7

DISTRIBUTION OF KOLKHOZES IN COLLECTIVE SECTOR*
1949 - 1952

Countries	Number of Kolkhozy			% of Total Prod. Coop.		
	1950	1951	1952	1950	1951	1952
Czechoslov.	136	259	—	2.6	4.1	—
Poland	1,275	—	2,113	57.9	—	63.0
Romania	1,027	1,089	1,796	100.0	52.1	56.5
Yugoslav.	806	1,049	—	11.6	15.0	—

* *C:* 1950-1951, *Czech. Econ. Bull.*, Feb. 1, 1953, p. 264. 1952, *Rude Pravo* (Prague), Dec. 17, 1952.

* *P:* 1950, *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), Jan. 7, 1951, 1952 (June), *Wies Liczbach. op. cit.*, p. 131.

* *R:* *Probleme Economice* (Econ. Problems), No. 5-6 (Bucharest), May-June 1953. Also: Gh Gh.-Dej in *For a Lasting Peace, etc.* (*Bucharest*), May 29, 1953.

* *Y:* G. J. Konrad, *op. cit.*

Though the multiplicity of collective forms might be taken to indicate a degree of concern for the individual predilections of the peasantry, the erratic course of Satellite collectivization—the fitful starts, jolts, and abrupt halts from year to year—indicates that the initiative always remained with the Bureaucratic Center. (See Chart VI. Had the peasants in fact ever desired collectivization, or had regime propaganda made appreciable headway in the countryside, a steady rise from 1948 through 1953 might have been expected. Instead, even a cursory study reveals a tendency toward "shock" collectivization and land massing in some years, and an equally abrupt levelling of the curve in other years. (See Table 8 and Chart VI).

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BULGARIA

Cooperative farms, in rudimentary forms, existed in Bulgaria even before the First World War. With the advance of Soviet power into the Balkans, collectivization began afresh; with the exception of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria revealed itself as the most vulnerable of the Satellites. Thus, nationalization of basic industries, virtual suffocation of small enterprise, and firm establishment of a one-party regime were achieved by 1947. The political opposition was crushed, the people subjected to an oppressive State apparatus, and mass collectivization begun in earnest before the actual Communist seizure of power in Czechoslovakia had even begun.

Bulgarian collectivization may be characterized by three distinct stages: the first (1945-48) witnessed the rapid organization of the collective farm system and the establishment of at least one kolkhoz in each community; the second (1949-50), a period of "shock" collectivization without parallel elsewhere in the Satellite sphere, saw the expansion of existing collectives and the creation of hundreds of new collectives, and the third (1951-53) was a period of deliberate consolidation in which only slight efforts were made to extend agrarian control.

For Bulgaria the year 1950 was the turning point, the "spinal year" during which the pace of collectivization approached that of Soviet collectivization. More than 60 percent of the entire task of collectivization was completed in that brief 12 month period; the arable area controlled by the collectives rose from 11.3 to 40 percent of the total national land. The most striking feature of the 1950 Bulgarian offensive was not, however, the number of *new* farms added to the existing system, but the increase in *average size* of

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TABLE 8

PERCENT OF ARABLE LAND COLLECTIVIZED*
1945 - 1953

	1945	1946	1947	1948	1949	1950	1951	1952	June 1953	Dec. 1953
Bulgaria	3.0	3.5	3.7	6.0	11.3	43.0	47.5	51.0	51.7	51.7
Romania					0.1	2.7	3.1	7.2	7.5	7.5
Hungary					0.5	2.6	3.1	18.2	24.6	20.0
Czechoslovakia**					5.4	16.5	19.0	37.9	40.0	38.0†
Poland					0.3	2.2	3.5	4.3	6.7	6.7
Yugoslavia**		0.9	1.5	2.3	13.3	16.1	13.8	11.4	9.5†	—

* Sources for these figures are given in Tables 11 to 20.

** Agricultural land, not arable land.

† The exact dimensions of the kolkhoz dissolutions which have taken place in 1953 in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia have not been made public; the figures given above are based on scattered evidence and official hints *Szabad Nep* [Budapest], Dec. 30, 1953, *Rude Pravo* [Prague], 19 December 1953, and G. J. Conrad, *Die Wirtschaft Jugoslawiens*, [Berlin, 1953].)

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CHART VI

COLLECTIVIZATION IN EASTERN EUROPE*

(Percent of arable land collectivized)

1945-1953



* Data in tables 9 through 17.

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TABLE 9

COLLECTIVIZATION IN BULGARIA*

1944 - 1953

Year	Number of Collectives	Number Formed Yearly	Number Households	Households per Collective†	Average Size Collective†	Hectares per Household†	Number Hectares Collectivized	Percent of Farms	Percent Arable Land
1944	110								
1945	382	272	34,362	90	383	4.2	146,570	3.1	3.0
1946	480	98	41,027	85	359	4.2	172,498	3.7	3.5
1947	549	69	44,100	80	327	4.1	180,040	4.0	3.7
1948	1,100	551	78,900	72	265	3.7	292,380	6.7	6.0
1949	1,608	508	156,483	97	343	3.5	551,572	14.3	11.3
1950	2,587	979	525,628	203	809	4.0	2,092,215	48.0	43.0
1951	2,739	152						51.0	47.5
1952	2,739	0						52.0	51.0
1953	2,747	8	568,989	207	915	4.4	2,512,500	52.3	51.7**

* *Rabotnichesko Delo* (Sofia), May 29, 1950, January 1, 1951, October 28, 1951, January 6, 1953; *Zemedelsko Zname* (Sofia), December 3, 1952, December 2, 1953.

** The figure given by the regime since 1952 for the percentage of arable land is 60.5, and this figure has gained general acceptance among Communist theoreticians and many Western observers. However, it is clear that the figure 60.5 measures a different arable land area than was used in computing the earlier percentagewise figures. The percentages given for 1949 and 1950 indicate that the arable land at the time was approximately 4.9 million hectares; but the 1952 percentage indicates arable land of only 4.15 million hectares. Since the regime has frequently claimed a steadily expanding area of cultivation, this statistical juggling does not make any sense. Therefore, this chart bases its 1952 and 1953 percentagewise calculations upon the same arable land figure used by the regime prior to 1952.

† Calculated on the basis of official data.

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the collectives themselves, a rise of some 200 per cent. In this respect 423
Bulgarian collectivization parallels subsequent events in Hungary, 474 ●
where the creation of new farms was accompanied by the rapid growth in the size of the average unit.

Bulgarian collectivization was largely concentrated in the fertile plains north and south of the Balkan Mountains, particularly in the black-earth region of the Southern Dobrudja acquired from Romania after the Second World War. (See Chart IX). Nevertheless, the average size of the farms incorporated into the collectives appears to be little larger than the average of those poorer farms still free. On the face of it, the facts are difficult to explain since the regime continues to concentrate on the richer farms—those producing effectively for the market, though less vulnerable to economic attack—and these, in turn, might be expected to be the middle-sized farms, and larger, in accordance with the general rule throughout the area.[21] The explanation for this paradox is perhaps to be found in the special conditions of local agriculture. In Bulgaria, the most valuable farmlands are not necessarily the holdings of largest acreage.

Thus, in Bulgaria, variations above or below the average are seldom extreme. The uniform structure of the pre-war agrarian economy has impelled the regime to mass small *rich* units, rather than proceed against holdings of any one class.

Significantly, the country which has had the most success in collectivization was the one which found it unnecessary to resort to a wide range of collective forms. Bulgaria has only one form—approaching the Soviet *kolkhoz*.

Romania

To date collectivization in Romania has proceeded more cautiously than in any other Soviet Satellite, excepting only Poland. The paradox of Romanian collectivization is thus that the nation is geographically and politically subject to the most direct and ponderous of Soviet pressures. Yet the "Socialization" of agriculture is little advanced. It is clear from the Romanian evidence that Sovietization is in no sense a uniform process nor collectivization entirely a doctrinaire program; politically Romania fell to the Communists very early in the post-war struggle, but evidently the nation

[21] According to a Soviet source, "in Bulgaria the majority of the members of the . . . cooperatives are middle peasants." (V. Tikhomirov, *Voprosy Ekonomiki*, Nov. 10, 1953, p. 89).

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CHART VII

[illegible] in YUGOSLAVIA by REPUBLIC*
1950

(Percentage of Agricultural Land)

* [illegible] Statistical Bilten, Poljoprivreda Beograd, No. 6, 1951, p. 5.

CHART VIII

COLLECTIVIZATION in CZECH REGIONS*
(Percentage of Communities with Collective Farms)
-1952-



* [illegible] March 5, 1953

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CHART IX

COLLECTIVIZATION IN BULGARIA BY DISTRICT*

(Percentage of Arable Land)



* Statistics from Report on Bulgaria, Institute National d'Etudes et Economiques (Paris), November 1, 1950.

CHART X

COLLECTIVIZATION IN POLAND BY PROVINCE*

1953

(Percentage of Villages with Collective Farms)



* Ekonomista (Warsaw) 3rd quarter, 1953.

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TABLE 10

COLLECTIVIZATION IN ROMANIA*

1949 - 1953

Year	Number of Collectives	Number Formed Yearly	Number Households	Households per Collective§	Average Size Collective§	Hectares per Household§	Number Hectares Collectivized	Percent of Arable Land
1949	58	58	4,058	72	—	—	12,500†	0.1
1950	1,027	971	67,719	66	261†	4.0	268,000	2.7
1951	1,069	42	75,065	70	277†	—	300,000†	3.1
1952	1,796	727	165,411	92	360†	—	700,000†	7.2
1953 (June)	1,980	184	185,000	90	369	4.1	732,000	7.5

* Speech of Minister of the Army Botnaras, *Scanteia* (Bucharest), December 31, 1953; *Scanteia*, April 12, 1953; Speech of Premier Gheorghiu-Dej, *Scanteia*, August 23, 1953; *Scanteia*, March 1, 1953; *Probleme Economice*, (Bucharest), No. 5-6, May-June, 1953; *Voprosy Ekonomiki*, (Moscow), No. 10, 1953.

† These are estimates, calculated on the basis of known ratios between number of collectives, number of hectares collectivized, and number of households.

§ Calculated on the basis of official data.

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has presented its rulers with singular economic and organizational problems. 423 474

The two crucial years of Romanian collectivization were 1950 and 1952; these two offensive years alternated with periods of quiescence. In 1952, more than 50 percent of the total area collectivized to date was brought into the "Socialist sector," and in the same year the size of individual collective farms themselves increased rapidly. Though the number of new collectives increased by only 75 percent, the area brought into collectives increased by over 130 percent.

In accordance with the general East European patterns, the Romanian collectives were composed of a high percentage of medium farms, a percentage which increased each year (see Table 11). In 1953, the middle farmers comprised 57.8 percent of the total, the small farmers 35.2 percent, and landless farmers the remaining 7.0 percent. While the average size of all Romanian farms is 3.6 hectares, the average size of farms brought into collectives is 4.0 hectares.

TABLE 11

DISTRIBUTION OF FARMS WITHIN ROMANIAN COLLECTIVE SECTOR*
1949 - 1953

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	1949-50	1951	1952	1953
Medium farmers	32.0	29.4	53.0	57.8
Small farmers	62.4	39.0	37.4	35.2
Landless farmers	5.6	31.6	9.6	7.0

* *Probleme Economice* (Bucharest) No. 5-6, May-June, 1953; *Nova Mysl* (Prague), No. 10, 1953.

A unique feature of Romanian collectivization is the establishment of a very "primitive" type of collective, the "Agricultural Associations." Whereas the other countries issue agricultural decrees with a single standard for the entire collective sector, the Romanian agricultural decrees usually distinguish between "Agricultural Associations" and collectives. Including the "Agricultural

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TABLE 12

COLLECTIVIZATION IN HUNGARY*

Year	Number of Collectives	Number Formed Yearly	Number Households	Households per Collective†	Average Size of Collective†	Hectares per Household†	Hectares Collectivized	Percent of Arable Land
1949	1,520	980	37,000	24	137	5.7	208,000	3.7
1950	2,500	1,233	90,000	36	176	4.1	440,000	8.2
1951	4,652	2,152	236,500	51	187	3.7	865,000	16.0
1952	5,315	663	318,500	59	258	4.3	1,374,000	24.6
1953 (April)	—	—	340,000	—	—	4.4	1,494,000	26.8
1953 (Dec.)	4,677	–638	238,000†	51	250	4.7	1,117,000**	20.0

* *Statisztikai Szemle* (Budapest) — various numbers, 1950; *Szabad Nep*, January 25, 1950, January 21, 1951, October 27, 1950, February 26, 1951, December 2, 1951; December 16, 1952, May 11, 1953; Radio Budapest, December 29, 1953.

** Estimated on the basis of the known arable land.

† Calculated on the basis of official data.

Associations", and the State Farms, the "Socialist sector" in Romania comprises 25 percent of the arable land. 423 474

Hungary

Collectivization in Hungary proceeded at a steadier pace than elsewhere. The tempo accelerated in 1952 and 1953, but land policy was not characterized by the abrupt twists and turns so pronounced in Romania and Czechoslovakia. Hungarian collectivization paralleled the Romanian and Bulgarian in that acceleration of the drive was accompanied by rapid expansion of the average size of the collectives themselves. Thus, the average collective organized in 1949 comprised an area of only 135 hectares; in 1952 the average new collective was 770 hectares -- an increase of over 500 percent!

Again, in accordance with the general rule, the primary target of Hungarian collectivization was middle-sized farms. The average number of hectares per collectivized household (4.4) surpassed the national pre-collectivization average (2.8). Before the wholesale dissolutions attending the Hungarian New Course, the collectivized sector occupied 26.8 percent of the arable land. Three types of collective farms exist in Hungary; the highest class, however, is not as "advanced" as the Soviet artel.

Czechoslovakia

In terms of pace at least, Czechoslovak collectivization represents a remarkable achievement--if East European rather than Soviet standards are applied. Despite a late start, the agricultural offensive proceeded more rapidly in Czechoslovakia than in any other Satellite, excepting only Bulgaria.

The land offensive was mounted in two waves, one in 1950 and the second in 1952. Unfortunately, reliable statistics on Czechoslovak collectivization are extremely sparse so no clear picture emerges. Only 1953 figures are available for the number of households collectivized, and these indicate that the land drive was aimed at absorbing the larger, more productive units. At the end of 1952, more than 56 percent of the middle farmers were in collectives of Types III and IV, while only 40 percent of the small farmers were members. For the actual distribution of farm-types in the collective sector as it changed between 1949 and 1953 see Table 14 and for the geographical distribution of the collectives see Chart VIII.

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TABLE 13

1949 - 1953

COLLECTIVIZATION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA*

(Types II, III, and IV)

Year	Number of Collectives	Number Formed Yearly	Number Households	Households per Collective†	Average Size Collective†	Hectares per Household†	Number Hectares Collectivized	Percent of Agricultural Land
1949	1,700§	1,700	—	—	—	—	375,000	5.4
1950	3,760	2,060§	—	—	302	—	1,134,392	16.5
1951	4,452	682	—	—	293	—	1,305,610	19.0
1952	7,290	2,838	—	—	356	—	2,598,073	37.9
1953**	8,284	994	343,911	41	—	8.4	2,900,000§	40.0

* J. Nepomucky, *Rude Pravo* (Prague), February 15, 1953; *Czechoslovak Economic Bulletin* (Prague), February 1, 1953, pp. 15-16; *Rude Pravo*, December 17, 1952.

** This figure represents the high point in Czechoslovak collectivization; by the end of 1953 the number of collectivized households had fallen off slightly (see speech of Agricultural Minister Uher, printed in *Rude Pravo* (Prague), December 19, 1953).

† Calculated on the basis of official data.

TABLE 14

DISTRIBUTION OF FARMS WITHIN CZECHOSLOVAK COLLECTIVE SECTOR*

—1953—

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Farm Unit (in Hectares)	Percent of Total Farms Collectivized
0-0.5	10.8
0.5-2	22.4
2-5	26.9
5-10	23.5
10-15	13.0
Over 15	3.4
	100.0

* *Zemedelske Noviny* (Prague), May 1, 1953.

Poland

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For a variety of reasons, the impact of collectivization in Poland has been slight. The State farms, organized immediately after the Second World War, controlled nearly twice as much arable land as all collectives formed by mid-1953. In central Poland—that is to say, in the regions of Poland's pre-war territories still remaining (excluding the formerly German districts in the West)—collectivization has hardly been invoked. The majority of Polish collective farms are situated in the old German regions of Silesia, Pomerania, and East Prussia—where the transfer of populations, confiscation of German properties, and firm Party political control made collectivization far easier.

Whether the vigorous land drive launched in early 1953 (and since slowed down in accordance with Satellite-wide political and economic policies) would have resulted in the rapid expansion of the collective sector is now impossible to say. In Poland, the average size of farms collectivized far exceeded the early post-war national average—approximately 7.5 hectares per holding as against 5.9. Thus, the weight of the Polish farm offensive was directed

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TABLE 15

COLLECTIVIZATION IN POLAND*
1949 - 1953

Year	Number of Collectives	Number Formed Yearly	Number Households	Households per Collective†	Average Size Collective†	Hectares per Household†	Number Hectares Collectivized	Percent of Farmers	Percent of Agricultural Land
1949	243	243	—	—	226	—	54,930	—	0.3
1950	2,199	1,946	49,500	23	218	9.4	467,611	1.4	2.2
1951	3,054	855	71,000	23	230	10.1	728,581	2.1	3.5
1952	4,900	1,846	100,000	20	204	10.0	1,000,000	3.1	4.8
1953§	7,982	3,082	189,000	24	175	7.4	1,400,000	5.9**	6.7

* Instytut Ekonimiki Rolnej, *Wies w Liczbach* (Warsaw, 1953); *Economista* (Warsaw), III, 1953; *Zycie Gospodarcze* (Warsaw), September 6, 1953.

§ Official collectivization statistics for 1953 are extremely confused and contradictory. The figures presented here are for June, 1953; in subsequent months different figures were released, but they were so inconsistent that the June estimates are employed here. During the summer of 1953 collectivization came to a halt in Poland, and hence the situation remained approximately static throughout the rest of the year.

** Estimate.

† Calculated on the basis of official data.

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CHART XI

COMPOSITION of COLLECTIVIZED and NON-COLLECTIVIZED SECTORS in POLAND 1953*

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

* Nowe Drogi, (Warsaw) No. 10, 1953, p. 183.

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423 474 against the efficient, surplus-producing farm units. A comparison of the collectivized and free sectors in 1953 is set out in Table 16. While only 40 percent of the independent farms were larger than five hectares, slightly more than 75 percent of those collectivized were drawn from this category.

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TABLE 16

DISTRIBUTION OF FARMS IN POLISH COLLECTIVE SECTOR*

— 1951 —

Farm Unit	Percent of Farms Collectivized
Landless	5.8
0 - 2	6.1
2 - 5	14.2
5 - 10	62.8
10 - 15	10.2
Over 15	0.9

* *Wieś w Liczbach* (Warsaw, 1951), p. 131.

423 474 In Poland the collective sector controls 6.7 percent of the total arable land, as against almost 12 percent organized into State Farms. Four types of collectives exist in Poland; the most developed type approaches the Soviet artel.

YUGOSLAVIA

Yugoslav collectivization is concentrated in two regions: the rich Vojvodina plain, north of Belgrade, traditionally the source of the greatest farm surpluses, and the poor mountainous regions of Macedonia in the South, where land hunger and poverty were extreme (see Chart VII). The collectivization of the Vojvodina was important precisely because of its capacity to produce a marketable surplus for the expanding cities. The collectivization of Macedonia was possible because peasant resistance was slight. In this two-pronged attack, the Yugoslav Communists adhered to the general lines of agrarian policy throughout the Soviet orbit.

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Collectivization in Yugoslavia presents an interesting picture of paradoxical extremes. Prior to its 1948 expulsion from the Cominform, and for a short time thereafter, the Yugoslav regime was the most "advanced" of the Soviet Satellites, swiftly smashing the political opposition, launching a massive program of heavy industrial development, and nationalizing the major economic facilities at an early date. But in 1951, after an interval of indecision, the regime embarked on a program of concession and retrenchment which, in many significant respects, anticipated the New Course later adopted by the entire Soviet sphere.

In common with Bulgaria, the first organizational basis for collectivization was laid down immediately after the war, and the major offensive launched in 1948-49. Moreover, like Bulgaria, the first break in the offensive occurred in 1950. However, the pause in Bulgarian collectivization represented nothing more than a period of consolidation, while the Yugoslav halt grew into the first slow recognition that political and social conditions in Eastern Europe would not permit repetition of the Soviet experience.

The first reaction of the Yugoslav regime to the break with the Cominform was to accelerate the pace of collectivization. Virtually 60 percent of Yugoslav collectivization was achieved in 1949 alone (See Table 17). And if the tempo of collectivization did not reach the pitch attained in neighboring Bulgaria, the struggle between the regime and the peasantry was, if anything, more intense. But it is clear by now that the stubborn resistance of the Yugoslav peasantry—partly responsible for the catastrophic agricultural failure of 1950—was not the only factor working for revision of agrarian policy. A great deal of the dynamism which animated the East European Communists was derived from its Soviet connection.

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TABLE 17

COLLECTIVIZATION IN YUGOSLAVIA*
1946 - 1952

Year	Number of Collectives	Number Formed Yearly	Number Households	Households per Collective**	Average Size Collective**	Hectares per Household**	Number Hectares Collectivized	Percent of Agricultural Land
1946	494	494	25,062	51	246	4.8	121,518	0.9
1947	779	285	40,590	52	270	5.2	210,986	1.5
1948	1,318	539	60,158	46	246	5.4	323,98[illegible]	2.3
1949	6,625	5,307	340,789	52	278	5.4	1,839,978	13.3
1950	6,968	343	418,659	60	318	5.8	2,226,166	16.1
1951	6,994	26	429,784	62	371	6.0	2,595,000	18.8
1952	6,908	–86	—	—	267	—	1,580,000	11.4

Informationi Priruchik, (Belgrade), Vol. I, p. 767; *Review of International Affairs*, (Belgrade), Sept. 16, 1952, pp. 16-18; October 1, 1952, pp. 17-18; G. F. Conrad, *Die Wirschaft Jugoslawiens* (Berlin, 1952).

**Calculated on the basis of official figures.

When these ties were severed in 1948, the Yugoslav Party began to lose much of its initial fanaticism and grew more complacent about its "historic tasks." 423 474

The revision of Yugoslav agarian policy in 1951-52 coincided with a relaxation of strenuous efforts to industrialize the country and a slight liberalization of the centralized dictatorship. When Tito stated in 1952 that long-neglected agriculture was to receive increased State assistance, the drive for collectivization inevitably lost much of its original meaning and force. The kolkhoz was primarily an administrative device to insure increased extraction of produce from the land at low State-determined prices, and if the State intended to increase investment in agriculture, the collectives were no longer a prime necessity.

5. *Summary*

A. This paper has made note of many of the important differences between collectivization in Eastern Europe and Soviet Russia --the greater reliance upon persuasion as opposed to force, the reluctance to open a full-scale offensive against the peasantry, the greater variety of collective forms and the greater flexibility of their usage. However, these were deviations from an historical norm to which the East European Communists were obligated for most of their inspiration. The enormous influence which the Soviet experience exercised upon them was evidenced not merely in the internal structure and organization of the emerging collective farms, but in their basic proportions (see Chart XII). With the exception of Bulgaria and Poland, the basic lines of the East European farms adhered to the pattern set by the Soviets. In the USSR the average collective covered 490 hectares of arable land; it was composed of 78 households; and each household tended 6.3 hectares of land.[22] The size of the Soviet collectives, and the area per household, slightly exceeds the average for Eastern Europe, but the proportions are so close to one another that the direct influence of the Soviet model cannot be doubted (except possibly in Bulgaria and Poland).

The peculiarity of the Bulgarian collective structure is explained by the centralization of each collective around one rural community with the subdivisions of control stemming from that community. The extremely small proportions of the Polish collec-

[22] Harry Schwartz, pp. 266-267.

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CHART XII

AVERAGE SIZE of COLLECTIVES 1953*



AVERAGE NUMBER of HOUSEHOLDS in a COLLECTIVE 1953



AVERAGE HECTARES per HOUSEHOLD in a COLLECTIVE 1953



* 1952
** 1951
† Data in tables † through 17.

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tives can only be explained by the great difficulties encountered in the whole Polish collectivization effort.

It should be noted that the countries with the largest average area per collectivized household are Poland and Czechoslovakia, while the countries with the smallest are Bulgaria, Romania, and finally, Hungary. The reason for this wide range does not lie in the original land structure, since the average collectivized property does not correspond to the average household area of the non-collectivized farms in the respective countries. The difference, then, probably reflects the success of the Polish and Czechoslovak regimes in collectivizing the larger, and more productive, holdings.

TABLE 18

SPHERE-WIDE COLLECTIVIZATION*

June, 1953

Country	Hectares of Arable Land	Hectares of Collectivized Land	Percent of Land Collectivized
Bulgaria	4,860,000	2,513,500	51.7
**Czechoslovakia	6,860,000	2,900,000	40.0
Hungary	5,550,000	1,500,000	26.8
**Yugoslavia	13,800,000	1,500,000***	10.9
Romania	9,750,000	732,000	7.5
Poland	20,760,000	1,400,000	6.7
Total	61,520,000	10,545,000	17.2

*Data in Tables 11 through 20.

**For both Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia the figures are given in hectares of agricultural land, not arable land, because the most consistent and reliable data are given in these terms. The effect on the percentage figures in the right-hand column is slight, if any.

***Estimated on the basis of regime statements. See G. J. Conrad, *Die Wirtschaft Jugoslawiens*, (Berlin, 1952).

B. In mid-1953, when collectivization was simultaneously halted throughout the Soviet sphere, approximately 17 percent of the arable land of Eastern Europe had been brought into the collectivized

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423 sector (see Table 18). Roughly another 10 percent belonged to the
●474 State Farms, bringing the total arable land in the "Socialist sector" to approximately 27 percent.

In other words, in over four years of feverish effort the Communist governments of Eastern Europe had not achieved what the Soviet government had accomplished in less than four months of its collectivization drive in 1929. As Table 18 indicates, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia achieved the most significant results; Romania and Poland lagged far behind. Yugoslavia and Hungary, which had done moderately well at one time, were to see the results of years of labor washed away in the onrushing New Course.

This failure was all the more notable for the fact that the Satellite governments had at their disposal not only the lessons of the Soviet experience but direct Soviet supervision as well. Certainly the bureaucratic methods employed by the Eastern European Communists, both in taking power over a silent people and in the process of collectivization itself, were partly responsible for this failure. In the next chapter some of the economic mechanics of the new agricultural order will be discussed and perhaps additional light will be thrown on the emerging debacle.

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471 private hands. In practice, nationalisation was carried out without legal sanction and under cover of a law passed on 24th November, 1944, for the expropriation of the property of the national enemy and his collaborators. On 19th January, 1946, *The Economist* estimated that the proportion of state and co-operative industry in Yugoslavia was 70-80 per cent, and the Moscow journal *New Times* of 15th March, 1946, wrote: 'The Government is in possession of 82 per cent of all industry, while private establishments account for only 18%'.

● 474 655 443 After this survey of the ownership of industry in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslovia, a brief examination is necessary of the control of trade. In all three countries private property lingers on to a large extent in one sphere besides agriculture, that of retail trade. In his speech mentioned above, Roman Zambrowski pointed out that in Poland the state and the co-operatives handle only 25-30 per cent of retail trade (in wholesale trade private ownership is negligible, the state taking 59 per cent of the turnover, the co-operatives 36.6 per cent, a total of 95.6 per cent). A similar situation exists in Czechoslovakia. Of the situation in Yugoslavia, B. Kidrić, said: 'Whereas in 1945, 85% of trade was still carried on through private shops, 12% through co-operatives and only 3% through state shops, in 1946 state shops already participated in trade with 19.2%, cooperative with 32% and the private shops dropped to 48.8%' (B. Kidrić, op. cit. p. 29).

'. . . on March 31st, 1948, private shops still participated with only 1.78%, the state shops with 39.91% and the co-operative with 58.31%'. (Ibid. p. 31).

In May, 1948, a new law nationalised all the remaining private trade in Yugoslavia.

In these three countries, the proportion of the economy in private hands was no greater than in Soviet Russia during the N.E.P.*

Hungary and Rumania

In Hungary and Rumania, Russia's demand for reparations and her schemes for the building of mixed companies which

*According to the Comintern weekly, *International Press Correspondence*, of 26th November, 1927, the percentage of private industry in the total industrial production of Russia in 1925/6 was 18.7 per cent. The proportion of wholesale trade in private hands was 9.4 per cent of the turnover and of retail trade 38.8 per cent (In 1927/8 the figures were respectively 1.5 and 27.0).

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369 standard of life and culture. Conversely, if the village supplied the agricultural products and labour necessary for the towns, industrialisation would have been much accelerated. These two conditions are mutually dependent. But the bureaucracy cannot tolerate a gradual development of agriculture and industry, and prefers to try to escape from the vicious circle by forced 'collectivisation'.

423 All previous land reforms had, for a number of years at
● 474 least, the effect not only of not increasing the agricultural surpluses available for the towns, but actually of reducing them. This is because large estates, based either on tenants' or workers' labour, obviously have relatively larger surpluses than the small peasant farms, even if both have the same productivity. Land reform, by dividing the large estates into many small peasant farms has, as an immediate consequence, a decline in the marketable agricultural surpluses. The surpluses necessary for industrialisation could be obtained by the encouragement of *kulak* farming, but this would be unwise from the standpoint of the bureaucracy, as socially and politically it would raise a new ruling class clinging tenaciously to private property, and economically it would lead to a demand by the kulaks for industrial goods in exchange for their surpluses. The bureaucracy needs a cheaper way of getting this surplus. It might have recourse to taxation and requisitions. But this too can hardly be relied on to provide large enough quantities of agricultural products for quick industrialisation, for the disgruntled peasant can 'go on strike' and decrease his sowing area, or neglect his fields, so that the surplus available for requisition decreases, or he can hide part of his yield, for it is impossible to supervise millions of small peasants scattered in thousands of villages. These drawbacks are virtually eliminated and the obligatory deliveries much more easily secured if millions of peasants are concentrated in some tens of thousands of large farms. The peasants, it is true, may react to their expropriation and herding in semi-serf camps by slaughtering their livestock. This may reduce the total agricultural production for a number of years and famine may stalk the land bringing death in its train, but no matter. If the quantity of agricultural goods in the hands of the state increases, everything is satisfactory. 'Collectivisation' also enables the state

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to supervise the labour power in the countryside, and, if the wages in the towns are not high enough to attract people from the countryside, they will be drawn there by the mechanisation of agriculture and the elimination of superfluous mouths in the 'collective farms'. Further, if capital construction is being undertaken, which demands very little skill and can be done by a large number of workers with very little or no machinery (for the bureaucracy likes to 'waste' as little of the expensive machinary needed for industrialisation and militarisation as possible) the 'collective farms' can provide an ample supply of this cheap labour from the 'kulaks,' i.e. all who dare to show any resistance to the bureaucracy. As yet it is scarcely possible to prove from experience that this will be the fate of agriculture in the satellites, because the process is only in its early stages. That this is the tendency, however, is clear enough, from the developments so far and from the history of agriculture in Russia since 1928.

The Example of 'Collectivisation' in Russia

The influence of the collectivisation of agriculture on the agricultural output in Russia is clear from the following table:

Year	*Sown Area*			*Gross Output of Grain*	*Cattle*
	Total	*Grain*	*Technical Crops*		
	million hectares			million centners	million heads
1928	113.0	92.2	8.6	733.2	70.5
1929 ..	118.0	95.9	8.8	717.4	67.1
1930	127.2	101.8	10.5	835.4	53.9
1931	136.3	104.4	14.0	694.8	47.9
1932	134.4	99.7	14.9	698.7	40.7
1933	129.7	101.6	11.9	808.2	38.4
1934	131.4	104.7	10.7	804.6	42.4
1935	132.8	103.4	10.6	810.9	49.2
1936	133.8	102.4	10.8	744.6	56.7
1937	135.3	104.4	11.2	1,082.6	57.0
1938	136.9	102.4	11.0	854.9	63.2

(S. N. Prokopovicz, *Russlands Volkswirtschaft unter den Sowjets*, Zurich, 1944, p. 133).

This shows that, ten years after the drive towards 'collectivisation' began, the number of cattle was 10 per cent lower than before, while gross grain output was 16 per cent higher. The main reason for the rise was the cultivation of new steppe lands which required agricultural machinery. The total

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423 sown area rose by 21 per cent and the grain area by 11 per
474 cent.
241 That the productivity of labour in Russian agriculture, despite the mechanisation, was not higher in 1931-5 than in the countries of Eastern Europe is confirmed by the following calculation made by W. E. Moore:

AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION PER PERSON DEPENDENT ON AGRICULTURE AND PER MALE ENGAGED IN AGRICULTURE, 1931-5 AVERAGE

	Per Person Dependent on Agriculture Crop Units	*Per Male Engaged in Agriculture* Crop Units
Czechoslovakia	45	146
Hungary	33	96
Poland	21	72
Rumania	21	67
Bulgaria	20	70
Yugoslavia	17	55
Albania	10	32
U.S.S.R.	17	53

(op. cit. p. 35)

Even if the improvement in Russian agricultural production after 1931-5 is taken into account, it is clear that her output per male engaged in agriculture was not more than that of Rumania, Bulgaria or Poland, and must have been far short of that of Hungary or Czechoslovakia.

Does this mean that the rulers of Russia failed to achieve what they aimed at by 'collectivisation'? This question can be answered by examining the proportion of the agricultural output taken by the state in the form of obligatory deliveries:

Year	*Total Yield*		*Obligatory Deliveries*			*Retained by Agriculturists after obligatory deliveries*	
			Quantity	*% of Total*	*% of Total*		
	gross	net*	million centners	gross	net	million centners	Index
1927/8	728.0	605.9	112.2	15.4	18.5	493.7	100
1932/3	698.7	570.1	185.2	26.5	32.5	384.9	77.9
1933/4	808.2	677.1	228.7	28.3	33.8	448.4	90.8
1934/5	804.6	669.5	226.6	28.1	33.8	442.9	89.7
1935/6	810.9	677.5	249.3	30.7	36.8	428.2	86.7
1936/7	744.6	612.5	260.0	34.9	42.4	352.5	71.4

*After deduction of seeds from gross yield.
(Prokopovicz, op. cit. pp. 136, 138).

From 1927/8 to 1936/7 these obligatory deliveries taken by the state from agriculture increased from 112.2 million centners to 260 million (i.e., by 131.8 per cent) and the proportion in the gross yield of agriculture which they represented from

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15.4 per cent to 34.9 per cent, and of the net yield from 18.5 per cent to 42.4 per cent. 423 474 241

The obligatory deliveries are virtually direct taxes, as the prices paid by the government for the products delivered is only a small percentage (not even 5 per cent) of the price which the government charges the consumer.

It is interesting to note that Lenin writes in his book, *The Agrarian Question in Russia at the End of the Nineteenth Century* (1908): 'The horseless and one-horse peasants (i.e., the very poor peasants—Y.G.) pay in the form of taxes *one-seventh and one-tenth* respectively of their *gross* expenditure. It is doubtful whether serf dues were as high as that . . . ' The agricultural toilers in the 'Socialist Fatherland' pay much more than that!* [651]

Collectivisation not only transformed into proletarians those who came into industry, but also those who remained in agriculture. The overwhelming majority of agriculturists are in reality, if not in theory, people who do not own any of the means of production: they are compelled to work an ever-increasing number of days on the kolkhozes for very low payment, below even that of the unskilled worker in the towns. The constant rise in the number of days that every household works in the kolkhoz compared with the quantity of grain per household remaining to it after the obligatory deliveries is shown in the following table : [461]

Year	*Average Number of 'Labour Days'† per Household*		*Grain Retained per Household after Obligatory Deliveries*	
	Number	*Index*	*Centners*	*Index*
1932 ..	257	100	15.8	100
1933 ..	315	122.5	19.3	122.1
1934 ..	354	133.4	20.1	127.2
1935 ..	378	147.1	20.5	129.7
1936 ..	393	152.8	17.3	109.5

†A 'Labour Day' is equivalent to the physical labour day of an unskilled kolkhoznik. The physical labour day of a skilled worker is equivalent to two, three or more 'Labour Days'.

(*Prokopovicz*, op. cit. pp. 136, 138, 164).

*Although the total quantity of products retained by the agriculturists in 1936/7 was lower than in 1927/8 (552.5 million centners and 493.7 million centners respectively) the quantity per household did not decline, and per capita of the agricultural population even rose. This happened because the number of households declined from 25.0 million in 1927/8 to 20.4 million in 1936/7, i.e., by 24 per cent, and the agricultural population decreased from 122.4 million to 78.6 million, i.e., a decline of 35.8 per cent. The fact that the per capita quantity of agricultural products retained by the peasants after making obligatory deliveries rose, does not mean that the conditions of the majority of agriculturists improved, because it was distributed more unevenly to the disadvantage of the masses. This cannot be dealt with here.

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To add to the difficulties of the poor agriculturists, not everyone has to give the same number of labour days. The higher strata of kolkhozniki give far fewer labour days than the poor kolkhozniki. The reward for their labours, however, is in inverse proportion to the time contributed.

There is less justification in calling the Russian agriculturists of today owners of the means of production than the serfs of the nineteenth century.

Miss D. Warriner in 1940 noted as regards the productivity of Russian agriculture: 'Russia both before and after collectivisation had a lower productivity than Eastern Europe . . . Russian collectivisation has not really achieved much increase in productivity through reforming the peasant system. Yields are still lower in Russia than in every part of Eastern Europe, cattle density is still much lower . . .' (*Eastern Europe after Hitler*, London, 1940, p. 4). In another place Miss Warriner writes: '. . . the physical output per man in corn is slightly higher in Russia than in the very poorest regions of Eastern Europe, and the value in terms of industrial products certainly lower'. (*Economics of Peasant Farming*, London, 1939, p. 188). As regards the standard of living of the Russian agriculturists in relation to those of Europe Miss Warriner says: 'As things are at present, on the basis of purchasing power, the Russian farmer is certainly not so well off as the peasants in Poland'. 'On the Russian farms meat consumption must be much lower than in Poland, and milk consumption must be lower also'. (Ibid. pp. 188, 189).* To gain a rough idea of what the standard of living of the Polish peasant was before the war, we quote the following passage: The Polish peasants' 'poverty was proverbial. It was said that during the depression the peasant would split a match four or five times, and would boil potatoes over and over again in the same water to save the salt . . . According to the Polish Minister of Finance the average cash income of the peasant in 1934-5 was eleven groszy (about one penny) a day . . .' (Henryk Frankel, *Poland, The Struggle for Power 1772-1939*, London, 1946, p. 134).

Miss Warriner's analysis, based on Soviet statistics, conforms

*It is regrettable that Miss Warriner in her new book *Revolution in Eastern Europe* (London, 1950) in the chapter 'Collective Farming' overlooks what she herself wrote on the question of collectivisation in Russia in *Economics of Peasant Farming* and also in *Eastern Europe After Hitler*.

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with the conclusion Victor Serge reached from his direct contact with Russian toilers: 'The vast majority of the peasants live more poorly than before the collectivisation, that is, on the whole, at a level lower than pre-war' (i.e., pre-World War I) (op. cit. p. 37).

The peasants did not gain anything out of the 'collectivisation', but that does not detract one iota from the success of 'collectivisation' from the standpoint of bureaucratic state capitalism.

Miss D. Warriner was quite right when she said of the results of 'collectivisation' in Russia: 'Apparently, then, most of the increase in output could have been achieved by extending the State farms in the sparsely settled and uncultivated regions, without collectivizing the peasant villages in the already settled parts; had there been no collectivization, then all the loss of capital through livestock slaughter would have been avoided and corn production in 1931 and 1932 would have been maintained'. (*Economics of Peasant Farming*, op. cit. p. 174). This is true. But then the state would not have got such a large part of the agricultural output for nothing!

The Satellites Follow in the Footsteps of Russia

Undoubtedly the circumstances in which the collectivization of agriculture is being and will be carried out in the satellites are to some extent different from those in which it was carried out in Russia. In part they will moderate its results, and in part will render them more severe. The moderating influence will be the lesson learnt from the experience of Russia, which will prevent the Communist Party from making similar mistakes in the satellites; namely, rushing through 'collectivisation' at a feverish pace, far outstripping the development of the necessary technical basis for large-scale farming, and then hastily retreating;* and secondly taking all the livestock—cows, sheep, poultry—away from the peasants and putting them into the kolkhozes, and then reversing their policy after half the livestock had already been slaughtered.

*In October, 1929, 4.1 per cent of all the peasants were included in kolkhozes. Five months later, on 10th March, 1930, 58.0 per cent were. There followed a hasty retreat, and in September of the same year only 21 per cent of the peasants were in kolkhozes. Only after this mismanagement did the tempo of collectivization begin to be less erratic, even though the compulsion to enter the kolkhozes remained very strict for the peasants.

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423 The Eastern European governments will avoid such damag-
●474 ing twists and turns.* According to the Plans, the technical
[185] basis for collectivisation will be much better prepared than it was in Russia. In 1933 in Russia, when 65.6 per cent of the peasants were in kolkhozes, there was one tractor per 615 hectares of arable land. When the current Plans are completed, the *minority* of peasants in the satellite countries will be in co-operative farms while there will be one tractor per 290 hectares. The co-operative farms in the 'People's Democracies' are leaving the majority of the livestock to the peasants as their private property, and are even compromising with the private interests of the peasants on the question of co-operative cultivation of the land, as can be seen from an examination of the types of co-operative farms in these countries.

In Hungary there are three types of co-operative farms:

1. The lowest, in which ploughing and sowing alone are done collectively while further cultivation and harvesting are done by the individual peasants. Draught animals or machines for the ploughing and sowing are obtained from the members or from the nearest State Tractor Station. In the former case, the members who own the draught animals or machines are paid a customary rent for them. Each member pays the cost of ploughing and sowing according to the quantity and quality of land he owns.

2. The intermediary type is similar to the lowest type except for the fact that harvesting and threshing are also done collectively.

3. In the highest type all the land is pooled for common cultivation, except for about two acres which are kept by each member as his private plot. Members are paid wages according to the amount and quality of work they do and rent according to the quantity and quality of land they contributed. No more than 25 per cent of the profit may be set aside for rent.

In Russia the peasant belonging to the lowest form of 'co-operative farm'—the kolkhoz—is allowed less private property than members of the highest form in Hungary. In many districts no kolkhoznik is allowed to own more than 0.6 acres, in others 1.2 acres and, in a small number of districts,

*[See category 116, p. 115 -- Analyst]

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2.4 acres, and no rent is paid for the land contributed to the kolkhoz. 423 474

In Yugoslavia there are four types of co-operative farms. In the first and second types, the land remains the private property of the co-operative member, and rent is paid for it. In the third type the land remains private property but no rent is paid for it. The fourth type is like the Russian kolkhoz. At present the overwhelming majority of co-operatives belong to the first two types.

In the Bulgarian co-operative farms the net income is generally divided thus: 60 per cent is distributed among the members according to the number of working days they contribute, 30 per cent is paid out in rent in proportion to the quality and quantity of land brought by each peasant into the collective farm. The 'Model Statute of the Co-operative Farms' (adopted by the Second National Conference of Co-operative Farm Representatives, held on April 5–7, 1950) describes another mode of distribution of the income: '. . . a number of working days, from 1 to 5 per decare (1 decare= 1/10 hectare—Y.G.) of land, depending on the quality of the land, fixed by the General Meeting as rent is given as a bonus to every co-operative member. In this way the working days given to every co-operative member for his pooled land are added to the working days contributed by him with his labour, and for the sum of these working days he receives agricultural and animal products and cash'. (Article 17b). For a hectare the owner gets a rent of 10 to 50 days. Since the maximum amount of land permitted a person is 20 hectares (except for Dobrudja where it is 30 hectares), a peasant who gives 20 hectares to the co-operative farm will receive a rent equal to the wages of 200 to 1,000 working days. The co-operative farm thus does not equalise the peasants and abolish exploitation (even if we discount the exploitation of the co-operative as a collective by the state bureaucracy through obligatory deliveries, the fixing of prices for agricultural goods, etc.).

There is another important difference between the agricultural working co-operatives in Eastern Europe and the kolkhozes in Russia. When a peasant leaves the kolkhoz or is expelled from it he loses all rights to the kolkhoz's property;

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423 when a peasant leaves the agricultural co-operative, he is
● 474 allowed, at least according to the law, to detach or sell the property he contributed or the plot he received in exchange.

On the other hand there are two factors which will render the results of 'collectivisation' in the satellites more severe than in Russia: 1. As we have seen, the increase in the grain output which followed upon 'collectivisation' in Russia was due in the main to the great extension of the area cultivated; but such an extension is out of the question in the countries of Eastern Europe. 2. Although Eastern Europe is not as suitable for meat and milk production as Western Europe, but, like Russia, is much better for growing corn, it already has many more branches than Russia of intensive farming (milk, pork, vegetables, wines, tobacco, etc.) whose prosperity is dependent on the existence of an urban population with a high and rising standard of living. The present regimes do not augur well for such a development.

Peasant Resistance

423 Although 'collectivisation' has hardly begun in the 'People's
474 Democracies', the agricultural policy of the governments has
668 already met with a peasant resistance which is on the increase. It is partly resistance to requisitioning and a protest against the lack of industrial goods and partly resistance to 'collectivisation' (of course these two reasons cannot be separated in practice).

Just as it was natural that the resistance of the working class to the industrial policy of the governments of Eastern Europe appeared earliest and was strongest in Czechoslovakia, the most industrialised country in the region (except for the Soviet Zone of Germany and Austria), so is it natural that the peasant resistance to their agricultural policy is boldest in Bulgaria. The reasons for this are: first, Bulgaria is the country least affected by the land reform, so that the peasants have not much to thank the Government for on this score; secondly, Bulgaria has the highest percentage of peasants engaged in small-scale intensive farming—tobacco, grapes, roses—so that the inducement needed to break their opposition to

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'collectivisation' is the greatest; thirdly, the basis upon which the industrialisation of the country is taking place is the weakest (except for Albania), and the industrialisation plan is the most ambitious (except for Yugoslavia), so that the need to squeeze the peasant is the most desperate.* This last point is clearly illustrated by the targets of the various Plans, all of which aim at the 'collectivisation' of only a minority of the peasants—except the Bulgarian plan, which by 1953 aims to have 60 per cent of the peasants in co-operative farms.

The peasant resistance took the characteristic form of non-delivery of their quota of products. Despite the good harvest in 1948, by October 10th only one district had delivered its quota, 13 districts had delivered between 80 and 90 per cent, but many more had not even fulfilled half the quota. (*Rabotnichesko Delo*, organ of the Communist Party, October 15th and 17th, 1948). 1948 was bad enough, but 1949 was much worse. The sowing quotas were nowhere near completion on the final date, March 15th. Only 56 per cent of the wheat quota was completed, 45 per cent of the rye, 55 per cent of the barley, 51 per cent of the oat, and 14 per cent of the sunflower quotas. (*Otechestven Front*, 25th March, 1949). The Ministry of Agriculture reported that many villages met great obstacles in collecting grain. In the village of Dimitrievo, for instance, the Village Council showed no effort to fulfil its duty and barely 1,200 kilos of grain were turned in. The co-operative of Yaborovo village refused to give up its allocation. Many villages had very inadequate granaries, etc., etc. (*Otechestven Front*, 31st July, 1949).

That even members of the Communist Party were taking part in the resistance of the peasantry to the Government's agricultural policy was made clear in Dimitrov's speech at the Fifth Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party (December 19th, 1948): 'In some villages there were "Party members" and even Party leaderships who did not head the campaign for ensuring food to the people and even de facto sabotaged the delivery of cereals. The same holds true for some village Communists who do not help and sometimes impede the creation

*Yugoslavia, too, did not undergo an extensive land reform, and its very ambitious plan for industrialisation is also based on a very low technical level. But there the peasants are much more tolerant towards the government, because of the threat of Moscow to it.

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423 of co-operative farms'. (G. Dimitrov, *Political Report to Fifth*
● 474 *Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party*, Sofia, 1948, p. 80).*
668 The extent of the peasant resistance and its causes were admitted to at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party on June 11th and 12th, 1949, where in an excess of 'Bold Self-Criticism', the Party laid bare its 'mistakes' and promised to relax its stringent policy towards the peasantry.

Shortly before the Plenum the Acting-Premier had said that 'no progress was registered since September 9th, 1944, in the output of cereals despite the import of tractors and other agricultural machinery and considerable agro-technical improvements'.

One of the reports to the Plenum says:

'We must admit that we have fastened the screw too tightly in our relations with the medium farmer . . . We must unloosen the screw and switch over to methods which will induce the farmer and especially the medium peasant, by an appeal to his self-interest, to improve and increase his production.'

The Plenum Resolution says:

'Excesses have occurred in the system of quota purchases, which have led to the requisitioning of practically the entire

*Two years later, in his report to the Plenum of the Central Committee (7th and 8th October, 1950) the new General Secretary, Vulko Chervenkov, gave many more details about the sabotage of the agricultural deliveries by Communist Party members and organisations. He said: ' . . . the former Minister of Home Trade last year, under pressure of various appeals from local organs, arbitrarily, quite irresponsibly, without the permission of the Central Committee of the Party and the Government, reduced three and a half times the plan for state grain deliveries. He was unable to grasp the fact that the appeals of the local organs reflected the pressure of private landowners and kulaks against the interests of the state.' ' . . . the party organisations in the districts of Bourgas, Gorna Oryakhovitsa, Rousse and Kolarovgrad . . . yielded to the pressure of a number of primary organisations which expressed private and kulak interests and attempted to wreck the plan for collecting the deliveries . . . ' The same crimes are attributed by Chervenkov to the first secretary of the Stalin District Party Committee, the vice-chairman of its People's Council and the representative of the Central Committee of the Party and Government whose special task was to inspect the collection of the state grain deliveries in the district. 'The District Party Committee and the District People's Council' of the Pleven district 'fell into the hands of the kulaks'; 'the inspector of the Central Committee of the Party attached to the Pleven district played an unenviable role'. In every possible way he supported the local leadership in its 'attempt to attain a reduction of the plan . . . ' The same crimes are attributed to the leadership of the Party and People's Council in Vratsa district and the representative of the Central Committee there, Dimiter Dimov, who was at the same time a secretary of the Central Committee of the Party and a member of the Political Bureau. And this happened after the big 'purge' of 'Kostovists' in 1949!

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marketable part of the produce at fixed low prices. This applies especially to grain farmers, who constitute the huge majority of our peasantry. In this way agricultural producers have been to a large extent deprived of their personal interest in developing and increasing production, improving its quality and generally raising the productivity of agricultural labour . . .'

'In the formation of the co-operative farms, instead of strict compliance with the laws, Government directives and Party instructions, throughout almost the whole country there have been irresponsbile requisitionings of the best and most favourably located land, which is incorporated in the co-operative areas, while the private farmers are given in exchange distant and barren plots. Farmers are not being compensated in accordance with the quantity and real value of the land.'

'. . . peasants are forced to join co-operative farms while they are still unconvinced of their advantages . . .

'To this end the Plenum decides:

'1. That fundamental changes be made in the system of quota purchases so that, while preserving the principle of progressive quotas, agricultural producers shall be left the greater quantity of their excess stocks to sell them freely to the state, cooperatives and consumers at free prices.

'2. That a real and fair correlation be established between the price of cereals and the price of other agricultural products, industrial goods and artisan services; that the prices of cereals be raised . . .

'5. That producers be guaranteed the freedom to sell their surpluses directly to consumers, after delivering their quota to the state . . .

'8. That the supply of the village with staple industrial products, both from local industry and from abroad, be improved . . .

'10 . . . . returning in certain places fields wrongly requisitioned from private farmers who received in exchange land of less value'. (Quoted by *Free Bulgaria*, 1st July, 1949).

The extent to which the Government overdid the exploitation of the peasantry was revealed even more clearly both by the evidence given during the Kostov Trial about the position of the agricultural population, and from the rise in the official prices for agricultural products after the June Plenum.

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423 In the Trial the defendant Nikola Pavlov stated that for
●474 some years up to the end of 1948 there had been 'a strict quota system which oppressed the peasants'. ' . . . the quota system attained such proportions, that almost everything produced by the peasants was taken away from them, according to this order, and only such a part was left to them, which could only cover the current needs of their families. The quota system included almost all rural produce which served for direct consumption by the population, such as wool, eggs, meat, milk, potatoes, even including apples, chestnuts and peanuts . . . ' This produced a sharp reaction. 'The peasants not only did not sow all areas that they had sown till then, but began to diminish them'. The deposition of Kostov showed very clearly that the poor peasants suffered no less from the quota system than the rich and medium peasants, and were no less discontented. 'The discontent of the poor peasants was also caused by the decree for the collection of wool . . . according to which even peasants owning 1 or 2 sheep were not exempted from the delivery of wool'.*

435 The extreme hardship the quota deliveries imposed on the[1]
474 peasants is illustrated by the fact that in 1948 they totalled
423 about 11 milliard leva, while free market sales totalled only 715 million.

How low had been the prices paid for the products taken from the peasants is revealed by the extent to which they were raised after the June Plenum: hard wheat was raised from 19 leva per kilogram to 25 (31.6 per cent); ordinary wheat from 17 to 23 leva (35.3 per cent); rye and oats from 15 to 20 leva (33.3 per cent); barley, millet seed and corn from 13 to 18 leva (38.5 per cent); sunflower seed from 25 to 30 leva (20 per cent); dried beans from 30 to 60 leva (100 per cent); lentils from 44 to 55 leva (25 per cent). (*Otechestven Front*, 2nd July, 1949).

*The question arises why we accept this part of the evidence when we consider the Trial as a whole to be a frame-up. (See pp. 301-2). It is one thing to believe in the reality of the meat shortage, the obnoxious character of the quota system and so on—which are known to everyone who lives in the country—and another to believe that only Kostov and his co-defendants were responsible for it, while the rest of the leadership saw nothing of it for three or four years. If we look back at the 'trials' of 'witches' in the middle ages, we may disagree with the 'prosecutor' when he accused the 'witch' of causing the outbreak of a plague, but still accept the accusation as evidence of the existence of a plague at the time.

[1] [Bulgarian --- Analyst]

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The resistance of the peasantry has also compelled the government to slow down its drive for 'collectivisation'. On November 15th, 1949, *Otechestven Front* said that eighty-six government commissions had been set up to remedy mistakes in connection with the collective farms. They had to inquire into the activities of 1,264 co-operative farms (two-thirds of all the co-operative farms in the country) and examine 61,854 complaints of illegal requisition of land from peasants who had not joined the co-operatives. In 35,311 cases the land had been restored to its previous owners and those responsible for the mistakes punished.

The Bulgarian government is, it seems, compelled to go gently with the collectivisation drive, but it nevertheless does not renounce its aim. While on January 1st, 1950 there were 1,600 co-operative farms with 156,500 families and 1,377,050 acres, on October 1st, the number of co-operative farms reached 2,249, with 474,800 families and 4,707,700 acres. Thus 43.4 per cent of the agricultural population is in co-operative farms. (Vulko Chervenkov's Report to the Central Committee of the Communist Party, October 7th and 8th, 1950).

Bulgaria is not the only country to experience peasant resistence to government policy. There is a food shortage in Czechoslovakia. The Russians are not responsible for this, as they buy scarcely any agricultural products from Czechoslovakia. Nor does Czechoslovakia export much food to other countries. There was a drought, it is true, but that was two years ago, and even at that time the number of livestock compared with pre-war was better than in any of the other satellites. Moreover the population was much below its pre-war number owing to the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans. The reason for the shortage must therefore be ascribed, at least partly, to the resistance of the peasants to delivering their products to the Government. The peasant resistance also expresses itself in the slowness of the progress of collectivisation. The Minister of Agriculture, Julius Duriš, said at the 9th Congress of the Communist Party, that in only 208 villages out of 13,000 were farm co-operatives operating (*Lidové Noviny*, 28th May, 1949). There had been many cases of almost open revolt at village meetings convened by the Communist Party to launch

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423 cooperatives, while other meetings had been boycotted by the
474 peasants. The General Secretary of the Party, Rudolf Slansky,
668 went as far as to say: 'The Party has failed to organise an explanatory campaign within its own rank and file, with the result that some Party members, not having been made to understand the significance of the co-operatives and not having been persuaded of their usefulness, have begun to waver and to fall under reactionary influences.'

Poland has had its troubles too. The Government was obliged to supply the wheat growers with far more industrial products than it had planned to do, and at lower prices than were prevailing on the free market. (*Glos Ludu*, May 4th, 1948). Other manifestations of peasant resistance disturbed the countryside. According to *The Times* of 25 January, 1949: 'During the last few weeks of 1948 at least 20 cases were published in the Government-controlled newspapers of Communist organizers killed while on duty in country districts. Most people think the figure much higher'. The Government in alarm retreated, and instead of carrying out its ambitious plan of organising 7,400 co-operative farms in 1949, reduced its target to a mere 200. (*The World Today*, August, 1949). The peasant resistance, although strong enough to slow down the collectivisation drive, did not divert the Communist leaders from their aim. On April 1st, 1949, there were 40 producer co-operatives in Poland; by October 1st, 145; by February 1st, 1950, 332, and by March 5th, 590. Of these 590 co-operative farms, 345 have been founded on a statute similar to that of the Russian kolkhozes, 192 are of what is called the second lowest type: 30-40 per cent of their net income is distributed as rent for land and implements pooled in the co-operatives and 60-70 per cent as wages for labour. 53 were of the lowest type: common cultivation of privately-owned land. (Roman Zambrowski, Secretary of the Central Committee of the P.P.R., in *For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy!* March 10th, 1950). We may assume that the tempo of 'collectivisation' will be accelerated after the first experiments have been completed. An important step in hastening the 'collectivisation' was the decree that put the zloty at par with the Russian rouble: every peasant had until 13th November, 1950 to give up 100 old zloty for one new one, while as regards workers'

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wages and prices three new zloty were changed for 100 old zloty. With their meagre savings swept away, the peasants' resistance to collectivisation will be weakened.

Rumania has also experienced great peasant resistance to 'collectivisation'. In June, 1949, the government had to take strong measures against a partisan movement in the countryside, strongest in the Banat region. The government called the resisting peasants 'kulak hooligans', but a mere glance at its extortionate demands from the peasants belies this accusation. Every farm, down to the very smallest, must deliver large amounts of grain for low prices. For example, a peasant who has a farm of only 3 hectares must deliver 22 per cent of the yield for less than 20 per cent of the free market price. (*Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 7th April, 1949). No wonder the peasants rebel. The 'collectivisation' of Rumanian agriculture is still at its beginning: in September, 1949, the number of co-operative farms was only 55.

In Hungary the government was very careful in approaching the problem of 'collectivisation' and for a long time denied any intention of proceeding with it. Thus, for instance, in a speech before a peasant meeting in Debreczen on June 29th, 1947, Premier Lájos Dinnyes said: ' . . . . if the Government had any intention of creating kolkhozy it would not have carried out the land reform. What is good in one country is no use in another. A Hungarian Government which aimed to give up the principle of private property would be digging its own grave and the nation's. We aim to fortify the new peasantry'. (*The Times*, 30th June, 1947). After a certain amount of manoeuvring, nevertheless, the Hungarian Government did proceed to 'collectivise' agriculture, but it did so carefully and slowly. Up to November 1st, 1949, co-operative farms made up only 3.5 per cent of all the arable land of the country, and state farms another 3.5 per cent. Since then it has advanced considerably. In May, 1950, co-operative and state farms made up 17.8 per cent of all the land under cultivation.

In general it can be said that the process of 'collectivisation' is full of contradictions. Its aim is to secure food supplies and agricultural raw materials for the towns and for export, in order to facilitate industrialisation, as well as to get the necessary supply of labour power for industry and public work.

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423 The greater the speed of industrialisation, and the smaller the
● 474 existing amount of capital relatively to labour, the greater the speed of 'collectivisation'. Hence Bulgaria and Yugoslavia have gone much further along this road than the other 'People's Democracies'. At the same time, the greater the tempo of industrialisation, and the greater the subordination of the people's consumption to the needs of capital accumulation, the less the readiness to wait for the establishment of 'collectives' until the technical conditions for large-scale agricultural production (sufficient tractors, combines, etc.) exist, and until the peasants are convinced that large-scale agricultural production is superior, a conviction which depends largely on the readiness or otherwise of the government to supply the peasantry with industrial consumption goods. Social-political factors—the fear of the government, first of all, that it will be isolated or strongly opposed by the peasants—can modify the extent, the speed and the ruthlessness of the 'collectivisation' process.*

The Primitive Accumulation of Capital

000 When the British bourgeoisie first arose it had to drive the peasants off the land in order to get the surplus agricultural produce for the towns as well as the reserves of labour it needed for its growing enterprises. Britain went through this phase of development mainly in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, of which Marx wrote: 'The history of this . . . is written in the annals of mankind in letters of blood and fire'. (*Capital*, Vol I, p. 786). In its rise the Stalinist bureaucracy must repeat the same process so as to get the wealth of the country under its control.

But much more blood flowed in Russia during this 'primitive accumulation' than in Britain. Stalin accomplished in a few hundred days what it took Britain a few hundred years to accomplish. The scale on which he did it and the success with which he carried it out completely dwarf the actions of the English landlords who let the 'sheep devour man'. They bear grim witness to the superiority of modern industrial economy concentrated in the hands of the state, under the direction of a ruthless bureaucracy.

*See pp. 246-8

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and supplied him with goods. Frequently he had a strong and pernicious hold on the peasant.

Therefore, the cooperative movement began with the foundation of credit societies which formed a very large proportion of all cooperatives. Besides these, there were cooperative societies which supplied agricultural needs such as tools and seeds, traded agricultural products, and processed all sorts of produce. In Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania the cooperative movements were state-controlled. In Czechoslovakia the movement was independent but favored by the state; in Poland, beginning with the economic depression of the 1930's it was state-supported and therefore dependent.

The cooperative problem was a difficult one. On the one hand, cooperation among economically weak peasants could not succeed unless there was some collaboration with, or help from, the central authorities. On the other hand, such a relationship between strong and weak tended to develop into state domination of the cooperative movement.

The administrators of the cooperatives sometimes abused their prerogatives. They would occasionally grant government loans, not in response to genuine needs or because of commercial considerations, but with a view to the substantial number of votes which one cooperative society could guarantee at election time. In some instances, cooperatives served only well-to-do peasants because some governments were opposed to the social revolutionary ideology of the smaller peasants. In Rumania the cooperative societies were forced to assume the function of the tax collector. In Hungary the cooperatives belonged to the peasants in appearance only. In reality, they were capitalist enterprises and were not in peasant hands.

Except in Czechoslovakia, agricultural cooperation did not play any decisive role in the economic life of the peasantry, nor was it able to alleviate the existing adverse

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conditions. Credit was no real help unless the peasant had a reasonable expectation of being able to pay back what he had borrowed. In many cases this hope was negligible. A large proportion of the money which the peasants, particularly the small peasants, borrowed went to buy consumer goods. Thus, greater indebtedness did not point to a higher degree of investment, but to the extreme poverty of the small farm.

There was some state help for this situation, especially during the world-wide depression of the 1930's. In Bulgaria and Rumania agricultural debts were converted by government action. In 1934 some two hundred thousand Bulgarian peasants benefited by reductions in their debts and in the rate of interest and by a prolongation of the time allowed for settlement. In Rumania some two and one-half million peasants were assisted by similar legislation. Other measures, although not so far-reaching, were put into practice elsewhere in Eastern Europe to alleviate peasant indebtedness. But the credit problem was only mitigated, and not solved. The peasants' need for cash remained, and the lack of capital still prevented them from improving their farming techniques or increasing their earning capacity.

The governments promoted intensive cultivation of non-cereals. Grain production was not appropriate to an overpopulated region, and a change to the production of livestock, livestock products, fruit, and vegetables was necessary. In Bulgaria and in some parts of Yugoslavia, intensive cultivation of garden crops, such as tobacco, tomatoes, wine, fruit, and roses was introduced. In Rumania, the cultivation of soya and other oil plants was introduced. These measures were, of course, just a beginning, and could not bring any substantial remedy.

Agriculture played the most important role of any single factor in all the Eastern European countries except Czechoslovakia. The largest part of the national incomes was de-

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reorganization of agriculture even more necessary than it had been before.

Land reform was a political measure. Its aim was not the reorganization of production, but the redistribution of income. Its aim was to win the small peasant for the Communists, and to weaken the political influence of the agrarian parties. Therefore, the Communists stole the programs of the agrarian parties and publicized them as their own. Beside private ownership, these programs called for mechanization, consolidation of scattered strips, good and guaranteed prices for agricultural products, expansion of credit, reduction of taxes, and social insurance for all peasants.

The smallholders felt quite happy, generally speaking, on their new land. It may have produced less than it had in the hands of its former owners, but the smallholders' income was larger than it had been when they were employed as agricultural laborers. Many of them started believing the Communists and joined the Communist parties. One of the Communist aims was fulfilled.

IV

It should have been obvious to all that the Communists were preparing a program of land collectivization, and that the second stage of their agricultural policy would be similar to what it had been in the Soviet Union. But sufficient attention was not paid to these trends. Practically all forests and large stretches of arable land and pastures became state property and were organized as Communist state farms. District cooperative or state stations were established and equipped with heavy agricultural machinery, which was not practical for use on small fields. The Communists favored the allocation of equipment to cooperatives rather than to private persons. The cooperatives, which performed many public functions such as bulk purchasing of food and supplies, began to

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474 be controlled by the state machine and not by their mem-
423 bers, the peasants. At the same time, the independence of the church and its economic influence on the rural population was broken.

Once the Communists were established safely in power, they shifted their agricultural policy. Except in the Baltic States where the Communists resorted to deportations and in Rumania where they evicted some seventeen thousand Rumanian families from their homes, collectivization was started smoothly and was not recognized as such. The Communists did not speak about collectivization, but about transforming uneconomical small-scale enterprise to large-scale cooperative farming. They are still making great efforts to convince the small peasants that as members of production cooperatives they till their own land and manage their own affairs.

Collectivization is being instituted by a clever transformation of the cooperatives. This process begins with a number of peasants being instructed to form some such organization as a communal laundry, a chick hatchery, or a calf station. Then, usually before sowing or harvest time, the members are persuaded to share their labor, teams, and farm machinery, which sounds like nothing more than neighborly cooperation. The farms continue to be made up of separate private parcels. The next type of cooperative eliminates boundaries and plows out border strips. The expanded fields are worked by the cooperative, with systematic planning for crops, fodder, and hay. Thus, collective mass production is introduced, but the land still belongs to the members.

Collective management is a function of the third type of cooperative. In this type the crops belong to the cooperative, not to its members. The owners of the land give up all their rights of disposal and of management. The members contribute their livestock and most of their agricultural equipment to the organization. Cattle are kept in common barns,

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but a member may retain one cow and a calf, some pigs, sheep, goats, and poultry. He also retains a garden plot of one and one-fourth acres which he can cultivate according to his own wishes. Ten to 20 per cent of a season's profit is deducted from the whole profit and distributed as separate compensation to those members who contributed land for the use of the cooperative.

In the fourth type, no percentage is paid for use of land although the fields still belong to the farmers in the title registers. All profits are divided according to the labor units of the members. This is the real Soviet collective farm, in which private property has become a fiction. Members receive advances in money or supplies during the year for their work. At the end of the year their accounts are balanced on the basis of production and sales.

Collectivization is proceeding at a rapid pace in all the countries of this region. According to the latest news, over 40 per cent of the agricultural land has been collectivized or, in other words, is in the hands either of state farms or of production cooperatives.

Production cooperatives are not genuine cooperatives according to the Western definition of the term. The communist philosophy of subservience rather than freedom, class hatred rather than understanding, aggression rather than tolerance, coercion rather than mutuality, is against all genuine, fundamental cooperative principles. True cooperatives can be founded only on the initiative of their members. Those instigated by authority cannot be considered true cooperatives, nor can those which are under the domination of outside influences. There can be no true cooperatives in Communist countries, because the will of the members cannot be expressed.

Production cooperatives are excellent examples of the Communist pseudo-cooperative. They are created by the government and are dependent upon it. They must accept a

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474 423 government-dictated constitution. Cooperative members, instead of being the masters of their cooperatives, are their servants. They have to perform tasks which have been fixed without their knowledge or consent. In higher type Communist cooperatives, the members assume the status of landless laborers.

If the complete dependency of the cooperatives on the State Tractor and Machine Stations and on the Communist Party is taken into consideration, it is clear that production cooperatives are no more than state enterprises under the disguise of cooperatives. There is only one difference between a state farm and a production cooperative: the members of a cooperative have to bear all production risks. It is true that *de jure* they remain owners of their land, but *de facto* they cease to be owners as they cannot be sure of getting their fields back when they leave the cooperative. According to the constitution of these cooperatives, a member must accept other fields, if return of his own fields would disrupt the cooperative.

474 661 565 The Communists declare they prefer that peasants join cooperatives voluntarily. However, they are not above persuading private farmers to join by such methods as higher taxes and higher delivery quotas, less fertilizers and other production means at higher prices, and charges for all services higher than those paid by cooperative members. At the same time, they give private farmers no credit, no field hands, and no opportunity to use agricultural machines, while collectives enjoy almost unlimited credit and other facilities. Members of production cooperatives are rewarded by the government with free vacations in the best hotels at winter resorts and with free group travel to the Soviet Union; they are a privileged class in every respect.

In contrast, well-to-do peasants who used hired labor in free times are denounced as being "village rich," a term which is used in Eastern Europe to describe the equivalent of the

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Russian *kulak*. The village rich are not allowed to enter a collective or are expelled if they become members. A merciless battle is being waged to ruin them. They are being liquidated as peasants, removed from villages, and sent to mines or to industry or concentration camps. There are roughly thirteen million peasant families in Eastern Europe, more than one million of which are *kulaks*. The children of all these families must lose the individualistic traits of their peasant heritage: that is the Communist aim.

Large-scale industrialization plans, for military purposes rather than for consumer production, are being pushed forward with great vigor in all Eastern European states and new labor is required in great numbers. *Kulaks* and other class enemies are an obvious source for this labor. By tapping this source, the surplus agricultural population will be disposed of and the people with individualist outlook gradually destroyed. If there is a shortage of workers in agriculture, as for instance in Czechoslovakia now, industrial workers already persuaded to the collective way of thinking can be utilized.

The term *kulak* has come to mean anyone who is against collectivization, and all *kulaks* are to be destroyed. The process of destruction is quickly changing the status of the agrarian population in this region. The agricultural population is decreasing and, according to estimate, does not amount today to more than 45 per cent of the total population. This decrease is the political consequence of collectivization and not its economic or social result. The collectivization policy itself cannot solve the old problem of rural overpopulation but can only aggravate it. The real aim of Communist collectivization is not to solve this problem but rather to destroy the peasantry.

Agriculture, like the other divisions of economic life, has been dictated by state plans which prescribe to the peasant what crops are to be grown and what animals are to be bred.